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Abstract 
 
Recently, a new buzz word has appeared in official speeches in the 
field of the European Union’s external relations: “Soft power”. The 
notion was first coined for American foreign policy and is now at 
the heart of EU foreign policy discourses, especially the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP launched in 2003 for the 
new  EU  neighbours  draws  heavily  on  the  experience  of  the past 
enlargements  by  exporting  internal  norms,  values  and  policies 
abroad. The article explores the hypothesis that the discourse on 
“soft power” represents an attempt to go beyond a traditional un-
derstanding of foreign policy and of conditionality. By developing 
its own definition of “soft power”, the EU tries to position itself on 
the international stage by preferring civilian over coercive means 
and thus seeks to increase the ENP’s legitimacy through attraction 
instead of accession. Nevertheless, it will need to improve its inter-
nal consistency if it wants to avoid serious criticism of the ENP and 
bridge its famous capability-expectations gap. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
A new buzz word has appeared recently in public speeches on the 
European Union, the (EU)’s external relations: “Soft power”. The 
expression, first defined by Joseph Nye during a debate on United 
States (US) foreign policy (Nye 1990a, 2004), is now at the heart of 
discourses on the EU foreign policy and especially on the European 
Neighbourhood  Policy  (ENP).  In  2003,  the  European  Union  de-
signed this policy to foster similar democratic values and  market 
economy reforms enjoyed within the Union  for the neighbouring 
states of the enlarging EU. The policy was first addressed to coun-
tries of the Community of Independent States (CIS), and then to 
countries of the Mediterranean space and the three countries of the 
Southern Caucasus, which are also CIS countries
1. The importance 
of this policy has been emphasised since 2004 by the presence of a 
“Commissioner  for  External  Relations  and  the  European 
Neighbourhood Policy”, a position currently held by the Austrian 
diplomat Benita Ferrero-Waldner.  
 
Literature on the ENP is now flourishing (e.g. Wallace 2003; Lave-
nex 2004; Cremona 2004; Dannreuther 2004; Smith K. 2005; Gou-
jon 2005). Scholars  in the field of European studies and  interna-
tional  relations  mainly  emphasise  the  strong  economic  links  and 
geographic proximity between the enlarged European Union and its 
new neighbours: Common borders and all possible risks emerging 
from an instable neighbourhood incited the EU to launch tighter po-
litical, economic, and cultural relations with these countries rather 
than to build a new dividing curtain. Due to the asymmetrical rela-
tions that placed close economic partners in a situation of depend-
ence to the EU, some authors felt that the ENP qualified as a form 
of empire or hegemonic state, with neighbouring countries becom-
ing  the  EU’s  periphery  (Cooper  2002;  Stratenschulte  2004;  Pri-
matarova 2005; Marchetti 2006). For EU officials, the ENP is rather 
about exerting “soft power” over the EU’s direct neighbourhood.  
 
                                                 
1 The  policy  now  includes  following  countries:  Algeria,  Armenia,  Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the 
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Scholars  still  have  not  paid  attention  to  the  discourse  on  “soft 
power”, which is developing at the EU level as a way to legitimise 
the ENP. This discourse represents a specific approach recently de-
veloped to define the EU’s foreign policy identity on the interna-
tional stage. In the ENP, it aims to include, rather than exclude the 
EU’s neighbours by resorting to similar policy ideas and philoso-
phies present in the enlargement policy, without – paradoxically – 
proposing any perspective for accession. Thus, can the discourse on 
“soft  power”  help  the  EU  to  bridge  its  capabilities-expectations 
gap
2? 
 
This article relies on an analysis of speeches and discourses by na-
tional / European politicians, Commissioners and higher civil ser-
vants interested in shaping the EU’s foreign policy. It is comple-
mented  by  interviews  conducted  between  2003  and  2006  at  the 
European Commission with civil servants of the DG Enlargement, 
DG Relex and EuropeAid who have been involved in the early days 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy and still work in the frame-
work  of  enlargement  or  neighbourhood.  Factual  information  is 
traced in confronting these various sources with secondary literature 
on the topic. The  method of discourse analysis (Van Dijk, 1985; 
Milliken 1999; Fairclough 2003) is mobilised to highlight how dis-
courses are constructed and conceived at the EU level
3. Interviews 
are used to confirm what the notion of “soft power” exactly refers to, 
especially among European civil servants, and in practice. Eventu-
ally,  the  article  shows  that,  policy  adaptation  took  place  mainly 
from enlargement to neighbourhood at the level of policy discourses. 
The article will show that the discourse on European “soft power” is, 
in the context of the neighbourhood, an attempt to go beyond the 
traditional understanding of foreign policy and conditionality.  
                                                 
2 Christopher Hill defines the notion of capability-expectations gap as the dis-
crepancy between the EU’s “ability to agree, its resources, and the instruments at 
its disposal”, on the one hand, and the increasing expectations within the EU and 
of third countries vis-à-vis the EU (Hill, 1993).  
3 Discourse can be considered as “a structure of meaning-in-use”, which implies 
that  discursive  studies  must  empirically  analyse  language  practices  (or  other 
equivalents) in order to draw out a more general structure of relational distinc-
tions and hierarchies that orders persons’ knowledge about the things defined by 
the discourse” (Milliken 1999: 231). For an academic discussion on the methods 
of discourse analysis, see: Milliken (1999).  198  European Political Economy Review  
   
2.  What is “soft power”? 
 
As  parallels  between  the  ENP  and  the  enlargement  have  shown, 
“soft power” mainly refers to the adaptation of the experience of 
enlargement in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
and represents a way for the EU to position itself on the new secu-
rity agenda, which was launched after the events of 9/11. In order to 
understand the text, one first needs to know the context in which 
these discourses emerge (cf Van Dijk 1985). The discourse on “soft 
power” has been promoted thus far by members of the Commission, 
who have managed to mobilise their experience on enlargement and 
assistance policies to shape the ENP’s policy ideas and instruments.  
 
2.1  “Soft power” in the American context 
 
The notion of “soft power” first became prominent in debates about 
the United States’ (US) foreign policy at the end of the Cold War, 
especially in the context of the détente when the US’s position in 
the world was qualified as being on the decline. It was defined by 
Joseph Nye, a professor at Harvard, and used as the main argument 
against Paul Kennedy’s thesis about the decline of American for-
eign  policy  (Kennedy  1987).  In  his  book,  “Bound  to  lead:  the 
changing  nature  of  American  power”,  Nye  (1990a)  argues  that 
Americans have a right to be concerned about the changing position 
of their country in the world, but are wrong to see this change as a 
decline. The main idea is that, in the era of the information age and 
globalisation, the nature of power has changed, thus enabling the 
United States to remain present on the international stage, but in a 
different way.  
 
“The sources of power are, in general, moving away from the em-
phasis on military force and conquest that marked earlier eras. In 
assessing  international  power  today,  factors  such  as  technology, 
education,  and  economic  growth  are  becoming  more  important, 
whereas  geography,  population,  and raw  materials are  becoming 
less important” (Nye 1990a: 29) 
 
In Nye’s mind, “hard” and “soft” power are complementary: “Hard 
power” needs to be present in order for “soft power” to exist and to 
be credible in third parties’ eyes. Nye particularly promoted this po-
sition when he worked as the Assistant Secretary of Defence for In-Tulmets: Can “Soft Power” Bridge EU’s Capability-Expectations Gap?  199 
ternational Security  Affairs under the Clinton government (1994-
95). There, he took a position against the withdrawal of US troops 
from East Asia (Nye 1995)
4. Nevertheless, in the context of the war 
in Kosovo and later the war in Iraq under the Bush government of 
the early 2000, Nye argued that “soft power” should be encouraged 
over  “hard  power”  in  order  to  increase  the  policy’s  legitimacy 
abroad, as well as to favour mid- or long-term influence and stabili-
sation processes (Nye 2002, 2004, see also annex). Although used 
in various contexts, Nye’s definition of “soft power” did not change 
over time, it still represents: 
 
“(…) the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than 
coercion or payments. When you can get others to want what you 
want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to 
move  them in  your  direction.  Hard power,  the  ability  to coerce, 
grows out of a country’s military and economic might. Soft power 
arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals 
and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of 
others, our soft power is enhanced” (Nye 2004: 256) 
 
According to Nye, “soft power” means lower costs in the long run 
by avoiding the use of traditional coercive foreign policy tools like 
conditionality,  sanctions  and  military  interventions  (“carrots  and 
sticks”).  “Soft  power”  cannot  be  separated  from  the  presence  of 
“hard power”: It can work only if economic and military might is 
present as a credible threat of sanction. But a policy will gain le-
gitimacy  if a country relies  more on its “soft power” than on its 
“hard  power”,  i.e.  on  co-optive  methods  rather  than  on  coercive 
ones (Nye 2004). Apparently, this is what inspired the new Euro-
pean discourse on “soft power”. 
 
2.2  Does “soft power” retain the same meaning in the European 
context?  
 
Security issues have become particularly predominant on the EU’s 
agenda since 9/11 (USA) and 11/7 (Madrid). They have also con-
tributed to politicise issues such as immigration and border man-
agement. They nurture the debate on the nature of the EU’s interna-
                                                 
4 I thank Pascal Vennesson for his comments on this and for attracting my atten-
tion to this aspect of Nye’s activities. 200  European Political Economy Review  
   
tional “actorness” and on its capacity to answer new security chal-
lenges. In the academic field, debates have structured around differ-
ent terms reflecting the evolution of specific EC/EU foreign and ex-
ternal relations. One cannot understand how the notion of EU “soft 
power” is used in the context of the Neighbourhood without looking 
at the academic debate that started more than thirty years ago about 
the capacity of the European Community to become an international 
actor.  After  the  failure  of  the  European  Defence  Policy  (EDP), 
François Duchêne (1973) described the EC as a “civilian power”, 
which Hedley Bull (1982) qualified as a “contradiction in terms”, as 
“power”  alludes  to  “coercion”  and  “civilian”  to  “legitimacy” 
(Sjursen 2006a: 172). Given the large part of trade in the EC’s for-
eign relations, Richard Rosecrance has described the EC by analogy 
to a “trading state” (Rosecrance 1998). The debate on the EU’s for-
eign policy arose once again at the end of the 1980s and the EC 
started to use conditionality in its foreign relations: It began promot-
ing  norms  in  exchange  for  assistance  and  trade  preferences  with 
third states. Thus, in 2002, Ian Manners proposed the idea of the EU 
as a “normative power”, i.e. as capable of affirming itself on the in-
ternational arena through the exportation of its own norms and val-
ues (Sjursen 2006a). This debate took on a new orientation after the 
launching of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at 
Maastricht (1992) and of the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP)  in  1999.  Some  authors  asked  if  this  development  would 
mean the end of the EU’s civilian power (Smith K. 2005), while 
others  explained  that  the  building  of  military  capacities  did  not 
mean the end of civilian power, since the EU itself responds to se-
curity issues more in a civilian than military way (Stavridis 2001). 
For example, the war in the Western Balkans at the beginning of the 
1990s revealed how weak the EU’s military capacities were. The 
EU preferred to get engaged in conflict prevention and crisis man-
agement activities rather than in hard military actions. This trend 
was  intensified  after  a  “softer”  understanding  of  security  was 
brought up by “neutral” member states (Austria, Finland, Sweden) 
and new forms of threats were defined after 9/11. The European Se-
curity Strategy of 2003 was elaborated on in reaction to the Ameri-
can security strategies issued after this event. It highlights the po-
litical will of the EU to rely on civilian means to resolve security is-
sues (Solana 2003). The Barcelona report on the “Human security 
doctrine” handed out in 2004 to J. Solana proposed to adopt this Tulmets: Can “Soft Power” Bridge EU’s Capability-Expectations Gap?  201 
doctrine, inspired by the experience of the Organisation for security 
and  cooperation  in  Europe  (OSCE),  to  enhance  the  EU’s  civil-
military capacities in order to deal with conflicts (Barcelona report, 
2004). In the context of the 2003 war in Iraq, the dominant positions 
of France and Germany, against military intervention, emphasised 
the different policy styles of the EU and the US when it came to re-
sponding  to  new  security  challenges  and  fostering  democracy  in 
their  neighbourhood  and  abroad.  Robert  Kagan  schematised  the 
(trans-Atlantic) dispute as follows: The EU’s power, based on the 
diffusion of norms and values and characterised by poor military 
capacities, “comes from Venus”, while the more military and mar-
tial American approach clearly “comes from Mars” (Kagan 2002). 
The old debate between “hard” and “soft” power, originally risen by 
realists and institutionalists for the American foreign policy alone, 
now takes shape  in trans-Atlantic discourse regarding the United 
States’ (hard power) versus the EU’s (soft power) foreign policy 
cultures.
5  
 
The policies of enlargement and of the Neighbourhood represent the 
first external policies of the European Union where the notion of 
“soft power” was explicitly formulated in official public discourses. 
The  Commissioner  for  External  Relations  and  the  ENP,  Ferrero-
Waldner, clearly mentioned in her speeches on EU foreign policy in 
January 2005 the importance of the EU’s “soft power” in the world 
as an answer to R. Kagan’s critique (Ferrero-Waldner 2005a). More 
recently she stressed the role of the ENP as a way to use and im-
prove  this  “soft  power”  (Ferrero-Waldner  2006b).  In  2003,  the 
Commission had already formulated arguments about the EU’s ca-
pacity to deliver, writing that the fifth enlargement was the “EU’s 
most successful foreign policy” (EC 2003a: 5). When Macedonia 
was granted the status of a candidate country at the end of 2005, the 
Commissioner for enlargement, Olli Rehn, stated that enlargement 
was “the most powerful political instrument” that the EU had at its 
disposal to stabilise and transform third countries into “stable and 
prosperous democracies”, and that this was due to the specific “soft 
power” approach adopted during the fifth enlargement of the EU 
(Agence Europe 2005). Eneko Landaburu, the previous director of 
the DG Enlargement and now the Director General at DG External 
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Relations, has used the expression “soft power” several times since 
his  speech  entitled,  “From  Neighbourhood to  Integration  Policy : 
are there concrete alternatives to enlargement ?” (Landaburu 2006). 
Like the European Security Strategy suggests, it is a way for the EU 
to present itself as an important, influential and legitimate actor, de-
spite the weak state of its defence policy (Solana 2003).  
 
 
3.  A policy, which attempts to answer internal and external 
expectations 
 
At the Commission, the ENP is seen as the “EU’s newest foreign 
policy instrument” (Ferrero-Waldner 2006b). Enlargement created a 
strong justification for the launching of this new “umbrella policy”, 
which overarches various sub-regional ones:  
 
“The enlargement of the European Union on 1 May 2004 represents a 
historic step for the entire European continent and presents a unique 
opportunity to strengthen cooperation with its neighbours to the East 
and to the South” (Council General Affairs 2004)  
 
But all the interviews conducted at the Commission between 2003 
and  2006  systematically  emphasise  the  contextual  difference  be-
tween enlargement and the Neighbourhood: “The EU has no means 
to impose norms to sovereign states actually not in the position or 
not able to become a candidate state” (Interview, DG Relex, Febru-
ary 2006; also EC, 2003a). The only way out for the EU is to rely 
on its power of attraction and persuasion or “gravitational power”, 
like Benita Ferrero-Waldner and Eneko Landaburu clearly stated in 
their  speeches.  As  already  mentioned,  the  EU  uses  its  internal 
norms and policies to secure its environment. It tends to avoid coer-
cive  means  like  military  or  economic  sanctions.  During  enlarge-
ment, the question of security was solved by extending abroad the 
policy of justice and home affairs, imposing the Schengen regime to 
the East and supporting the parallel accession of EU candidates into 
NATO. The redefinition of cooperative and stable relations with the 
EU’s new neighbours is more challenging. As a matter of fact, sev-
eral countries are struggling with internal crisis or linked to regional 
ones and their geographical proximity is perceived as a danger for 
the  EU’s  stability  and  security.  In  its  strategic  documents,  the Tulmets: Can “Soft Power” Bridge EU’s Capability-Expectations Gap?  203 
Commission  mentions  the  tense  situations  in  Transdniestria 
(Moldova), between Morocco and Western Sahara, in the Middle-
East and in the Southern Caucasus (EC 2004a). Therefore, the ENP 
must grasp more experiences than just that of the enlargement in 
order to ensure peace and stability, e.g. the experience in the West-
ern Balkans.  
 
3.1  A policy designed to answer the EU’s own expectations 
 
Like Marchetti shows in this issue, the internal crisis that the EU  
faces, along with discussions about the constitutional treaty and fur-
ther enlargements, justified the creation of a policy aimed at secu-
ritising  the  EU’s  borders  and  supporting  stability  around  the 
enlarged EU. However, the legitimacy of European issues has been 
weakened and should be elaborated under the context of the failed 
constitutional treaty, which was rejected in 2005 by referendum in 
France and the Netherlands. According to the literature on securiti-
sation, the EU also needs to construct potential threats in order to 
justify its policy to public opinion (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1995; 
Bigo  2000;  Balzacq  2005).  During  the  enlargements,  public 
speeches helped to foster the acceptance of  internal EU reforms: 
The communautarisation of the third pillar in 1997 was possible be-
cause,  for public opinion, enlargement would  imply  new  internal 
threats (immigration, traffics, terrorism) if the new EU borders were 
not secure. The first speeches about Wider Europe, and then on the 
ENP, clearly point towards a necessity to answer similar expecta-
tions within the EU (Prodi 2002; Ferrero-Waldner 2005b). Potential 
threats – terrorism, illegal traffic, instability in bordering regions – 
listed in these speeches also contributed to the justification of grow-
ing financial expenses for the period of 2007-13 towards the ENP 
countries. The discourse on the EU’s “attractive” and “transforma-
tive power” is a way to answer these expectations and to inform the 
EU’s  public  that, the  policy  will  have  to  last  some  decades  if  it 
wants to achieve results in a peaceful and non militaristic way.  
 
In the mind of Commission members, this discourse at the EU level 
is another way to make the public understand why it is necessary 
that the EU become a global player and to  justify the Commission´s  
central role in the management of the policy. In 2002, R. Prodi ex-
plained that the Union must take the necessary measures in order to 204  European Political Economy Review  
   
answer to its growing global responsibilities: “If we want to satisfy 
the rising expectations and hopes of countries abroad and the peo-
ples of Europe, we have to become a real global player. We are only 
beginning to act as one” (Prodi 2002). In the Commissioner’s mind, 
the EU has to act as an attractive “global player” and to position it-
self on the international stage in a different manner than the US or 
Russia (Ferrero-Waldner 2005a; Interviews, DG Enlargement, DG 
Relex, 2006). But this can only take place through a process of ad-
aptation and constant learning.  
 
While the launching phase of the ENP, in 2002-2004, corresponded 
with a process of limited rationality, it seems that the ENP is now 
slowly entering a second phase of learning based on its past failures 
and adapted for this new political context. As described by C. Lind-
blom  (1959),  limited  rationality  implies  that  civil  servants  repro-
duce or imitate in a different context what they can do best. In the 
first speeches, “soft power” referred to the EU’s specific way of 
building stability through enlargement: “The ENP is an opportunity 
for us, and our partners, to share the benefits which we have derived 
from  half  a  century  of  peaceful  integration”  (Ferrero-Waldner 
2005b; see also EC 2003a). But recent interviews at the Commis-
sion reveal that the experience  in the Western  Balkans  now also 
plays a major role in the context of neighbourhood. EU officials do 
not want to replicate what is often considered as a “failure” in the 
EU’s external policy on European territory. Multiple conferences 
highlighting the weaknesses of the ENP, as it stands now, also push 
EU civil servants to reflect on past learning to perfect the ENP. This 
is done especially in the field of conflict prevention and crisis man-
agement, which still represents a major weakness in the EU’s ca-
pacity to deliver. 
 
3.2  Attraction instead of accession: A policy that falls short for 
the ENP countries 
 
The new policy discourse also aims at answering the expectations of 
the ENP countries. At least three groups of countries can be identi-
fied according to their governmental, political positions (presence 
or absence of expectations vis-à-vis the enhanced cooperation with 
the EU) and/or to their perspective of accession (presence or ab-
sence of expectations linked to accession):  Tulmets: Can “Soft Power” Bridge EU’s Capability-Expectations Gap?  205 
a) A first group of countries is not participating in the ENP, as a re-
sult of political decisions on the side of the neighbour state (e.g. 
Russia, Belarus, Algeria) and/or the lack of political consensus on 
the side of the EU (e.g. Belarus, Libya, Syria). Depending on the 
political situation and will of the neighbour countries (e. g. Belarus) 
and on the evolution of political discussions within the EU, these 
countries could become an active part of the ENP.  
b) A second group is the countries which negotiated the Association 
Agreement  (AA)  or  Partnership  and  Cooperation  Agreements 
(PCA) and are interested in enhancing their relations with the EU in 
various policy fields through the negotiation of more precise and 
politically engaging Action Plans. These countries are part of the 
ENP but have no perspective of accession or have not expressed in-
terest in EU membership so far (e.g. Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Is-
rael, the Palestinian Authority, Armenia, and Azerbaijan). Differen-
tiation among this group is important as the degree of cooperation 
with the EU varies greatly.  
c) The third group is composed of countries motivated by closer ties 
to the EU, in particular because they have a right – and expressed 
the wish – to become candidate countries to the EU (e.g. Ukraine, 
Georgia, and Moldova). But at the moment, the ENP clearly repre-
sents an “offer”, a “concrete alternative” to enlargement, (e.g. Land-
aburu 2006) which tends to take the shape of a policy with variable 
geometry (Tulmets 2006). 
 
What the concept of “soft power” entails – and the academic no-
tions of civilian / normative / civilizing power does not address
6 – is 
the will of the EU to become a pole of attraction for third states.  
 
“How can we [the EU] use our soft power, our transformative power, 
our gravitational influence, to leverage the reforms we would like to 
see in our neighbourhood? (…) We are a ‘pole of attraction’ for our 
region  –  countries  along  our  borders actively  seek  closer relations 
with us and we, in turn, want closer relations with these neighbours” 
(Landaburu 2006: 2, 3) 
 
One of the main lessons learned from enlargement is that the adop-
tion of the EU norms was facilitated by the incentive of accession 
and the political will of third countries to do so. Without the per-
                                                 
6 For an academic discussion of these terms, see Sjursen (2006a). 206  European Political Economy Review  
   
spective of accession, the only option for the EU is to be attractive 
so that third states comply with its norms and take recommenda-
tions seriously:  
 
“The goal of accession is certainly the most powerful stimulus for re-
form we can think of. But why should a less ambitious goal not have 
some effect? A substantive and workable concept of proximity would 
have a positive effect (…). It must be attractive, it must unlock new 
prospects and create an open and dynamic framework” (Prodi 2002). 
 
In various speeches, “soft power” also means the ability of the EU to 
persuade third states to comply with its norms and values:  
 
“It is true that our principal source of power – our power of attrac-
tion – is “soft” rather than “hard”. But it is no less potent. (…) If 
we are to preserve an international order based on the rule of law 
and respect for those values we hold dear – human rights, democ-
racy, good governance – we need to be using all means at our dis-
posal to persuade emerging powers to sign up to it now” (Ferrero-
Waldner, 2006a). 
 
These elements have also been stressed by Robert Cooper, a British 
diplomat working at the Council, and Eneko Landaburu, the Director 
General of DG Relex. Ferrero-Waldner further made references to 
Chris Patten’s expression of “soft power” as a “weapon of mass at-
traction”, a quotation that comes from the previous Commissioner’s 
book,  “Not  quite  the  diplomat”  (Patten  2005).
7 For  B.  Ferrero-
Waldner, “soft power” does not exclude the complementary use of 
“hard power”, i.e. the use of military means or economic sanctions: 
“We  need  to  link  intelligently  firm  action  to  soft  influence,  ‘hard 
power’ to ‘soft power’” (Ferrero-Waldner 2005a; 2006a). In absence 
of  credible  military  means,  conditionality  is  considered  to  be  the 
EU’s “hard power”; it means that the EU can rely on various instru-
ments  like  the  suspension  of  economic  agreements  when  engage-
ments are not respected. In the context of the last enlargement, con-
ditionality particularly “worked” because of the incentive of acces-
sion. Without this incentive, the EU’s “hard power” loses legitimacy. 
Interviews at the Commission revealed that persuasion through nego-
tiation in committees or in forums as well as shaming through annual 
                                                 
7 I thank René Vandermosten, European Commission Fellow at the EUI in 2005-
06, for alerting me on this point.  Tulmets: Can “Soft Power” Bridge EU’s Capability-Expectations Gap?  207 
reports were considered more efficient ways to shape relations with 
third states than the traditional (negative) conditionality (interview, 
DG  Enlargement  /  Western  Balkan,  April  2006).  The  mutually 
agreed Action plans (a sort of “political contracts”) should represent 
a way to answer criticism about the asymmetry of economic agree-
ments  (association  agreements,  Partnership  and  cooperation  agree-
ments) as well as about the unilateral character of conditionality.  
 
Speeches about “soft power” are also representative of a clear de-
mand to shape the EU policy style on the international stage and to 
differentiate  it  from  the  American  style  in  the  eyes  of  the 
neighbours: 
 
“If we look at the likely shape of the world in 50 years, the ability 
to deploy considerable soft power will be vital. Today the EU and 
US have unrivalled influence in terms of relative wealth and power. 
But  power relationships  may  look  rather  different  in  the future” 
(Ferrero-Waldner 2006a). 
 
This is also stated openly in interviews, where mid- and long-term 
processes are stressed: “Like Prodi said, the ENP is not about hard 
security, it has to be seen in terms of soft security, we don’t want 
any big bang strategy, like the Americans have, where everything is 
first destroyed and then you have to rebuild the country, the EU has 
a  more patient approach” (Interview, DG Relex, February 2006). 
The ENP also aims at positioning the EU in the regions that Russia 
developed its policy of “near abroad” in: “Countries in the Caucasus 
or Eastern Europe are asking the EU to offer an alternative to the 
Russian or the American presence on their territory. (…) The Rus-
sian policy of ‘near abroad’ is not going to help the ENP; we will 
have  to take the  Russian  factor  in  our  bilateral  negotiations.  [If] 
Russia wants to see that there is only one winner, [then] there will 
be no possibility to share cooperation in Eastern Europe and Cauca-
sus”  (Interview,  DG  Relex,  February  2006).  More than  ever, the 
discourse on the EU’s “soft power” is undermined by the fact that 
the EU still faces the difficult task of clarifying the nature of its 
Trans-Atlantic relations, especially after the war in Iraq, which re-
vealed differences among member states, and of redefining its rela-
tions with Russia, who refused to be part of the ENP.  
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The way the term “soft power” is used in speeches on the ENP ap-
parently confirms the thesis that “the EU still prefers positive civil-
ian  to  coercive  military  measures”  (Smith  2003:  111;  Sjursen 
2006b: 237). Even cooperation  in the  field of crisis  management 
emphasises  the  civilian  dimension  of  such  projects  and  missions 
(Solana 2003). In absence of military “hard power”, European “soft 
power”  cannot  be  compared  with  the  American  one:  The  back-
ground on which it relies is not a military, but mainly an economic 
one (economic sanctions)
8. 
 
However, the financial means mobilised to answer the neighbours’ 
expectations are not very high. The Commission proposed to adopt 
a  budget  of  €15  billion  for  the  period  of  2007-13  (EC,  2003b), 
though the Council only agreed to provide €12 billion. While the 
new budget represents an augmentation of 40% compared to what 
was allocated previously to TACIS and MEDA together, the €12 
billion of the ENPI are to be shared among 16 countries plus Russia 
for a period of seven years. Officials of the Commission explained 
that they now have “to manage the expectations of the partner coun-
tries (…) and explain to them that a golden shower will not come 
with the ENP” (Interview, DG Relex, 2006).  
 
 
4.  What is the EU’s “soft power” capable of? 
 
Speeches at the EU level and documents from the Commission on 
the ENP show that many elements of the enlargement policy have 
clearly been taken over and adapted to the context of neighbour-
hood  (EC  2003a,  2004a;  Del  Sarto,  Schumacher  2005;  Tulmets 
2005b; Kelley 2006; Harasimowicz 2006)
9. However, both policies 
have  opposite  purposes:  Enlargement  aims  at  including  countries 
while the ENP insists on maintaining a certain distance between the 
                                                 
8 I thank Pascal Vennesson for his very useful remarks on this point. On eco-
nomic sanctions, see Wilde D’Estmael (1998). 
9 Harasimowicz lists following similar policy instruments (2006: 340): “The ENP 
is based on the set of policies and instruments adopted in last enlargement proc-
ess: common values, market opening, legal and institutional adjustment, a diversi-
fied approach, conditional and targeted assistance, structured political dialogue, 
including security, cultural cooperation, benchmarking, etc.”.  Tulmets: Can “Soft Power” Bridge EU’s Capability-Expectations Gap?  209 
EU and the neighbours
10. Nevertheless, specific policy ideas, con-
cepts  and  methods  have  been  shaped  to  export  internal  policies 
abroad and to implement the ENP on the basis of the experience of 
enlargement to build an “over-arching” policy, which should, ide-
ally, be able to exert a “soft power” on its neighbourhood. 
 
4.1  Common values as guidelines 
 
Like in enlargement, the ENP aims to export the EU’s values and 
norms by extending its internal policy networks abroad. Policy dis-
courses on the ENP are clearly constructed around three main issues 
– security, stability and prosperity (Prodi 2002; EC 2003a; Land-
aburu 2006; Ferrero-Waldner 2006b) – which are then detailed in 
the Action plans (EC 2004b):  
 
“These Action Plans cover a wide range of elements, from judicial 
and administrative capacity building to cooperation on energy is-
sues; from discussions on human rights to transfer of know-how on 
regulatory  issues;  and  from  involvement  in  EU  internal  pro-
grammes to detailed information about our standards and norms” 
(Ferrero-Waldner 2006c). 
 
The  politicisation  of  these  various  sectoral  issues  clearly  corre-
sponds to the creation of foreign policy by the exportation of the 
EU’s internal norms and values abroad, in addition to classical for-
eign policy tools. This process was made possible when policy ad-
aptation of internal policies took place in the ENP, via enlargement, 
a process which is often seen as an answer to globalisation: 
 
“We already have an impressive range of policy instruments, in-
cluding  development  aid,  diplomacy,  trade  policy,  civilian  and 
military crisis management, and humanitarian assistance. We also 
need to do more to recognize and utilise the external dimension of 
the EU’s internal policies. Thanks to globalization, most internal 
policies  now  have  an  international  element”  (Ferrero-Waldner, 
2006a) 
 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  these  policies  are  as  diverse  as  agriculture, 
competition, environment, fisheries, justice and home affairs, etc. 
Enlargement has always represented a strong incentive and window 
                                                 
10 I thank Helen Wallace for her comments on this point. 210  European Political Economy Review  
   
of opportunity for the European community/Union to reform itself 
and  thus,  to  export  its own  norms  abroad. The  deepening  which 
runs parallel to the fifth enlargement played an important role in 
helping the EU define its own identity, especially through the two 
Intergovernmental Conferences (conventions), which were aimed at 
constitutionalising the EU’s norms and values. The Charter of Fun-
damental rights, although un-constitutionalised as long as the con-
stitutional treaty of 2005 is not ratified, already serves as a norma-
tive reference in decisions of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities. The Commission also referred to this document dur-
ing quite often during the accession. This was done in order to put 
more pressure on accession countries and give consistency to acces-
sion criteria. In this sense, it is difficult to separate deepening from 
enlarging, as both play a role in linking internal policies to external 
ones, thus externalising the EU’s policies, norms and standards
11.  
 
4.2  The diffusion of a philosophy based on conditionality, part-
nership and differentiation 
 
In the 2003 communication about the Neighbourhood, the Commis-
sion had already insisted on the specific philosophy the ENP should 
adopt to complement the already existing policies in its neighbour-
hood, namely  “a differentiated, progressive and benchmarked ap-
proach”  (EC  2003a:  15).  By  this,  it  is  meant  that  “the  new 
neighbourhood policy should not override the existing framework 
for EU relations with [third] countries (…), instead, it should sup-
plement and build on existing policies and arrangements” and re-
spect  the  rhythm  of  each  country  coming  closer  to  the  EU  (EC 
2003a: 15,16). The Commission proposed that benchmarks “should 
be developed in close cooperation with the partner countries them-
selves, in order to ensure national ownership and commitment” (EC 
2003a: 16); thus, to counter-balance the unilateral approach of con-
ditionality, benchmarks should “offer greater predictability and cer-
tainty for the partner country than the traditional ‘conditionality’” 
(Ibid). 
                                                 
11 This process of externalisation is quite similar to what authors have called a 
process of transnationalisation within (Hassenteufel, 2005) and outside the EU 
(Stone 2004; Lavenex 2004) which in praxis takes the shape of sectoral “network 
governance” (Filtenborg, Gänzle, Johansson 2002). Tulmets: Can “Soft Power” Bridge EU’s Capability-Expectations Gap?  211 
 
After 1997, the asymmetrical and unilateral character of relations 
between the EU and the candidates was replaced by a philosophy of 
partnership and negotiation, not only for the first six countries ac-
cepted for the accession negotiations in 1997, but also for all other 
candidates, including Turkey, that were accepted later in 1999 to 
negotiate.  Traditional  conditionality  was  therefore  complemented 
by a negotiated approach based on socialisation, which coincided 
with the opening of accession negotiations (Tulmets 2005a, 2006). 
Drawing  on  this  experience,  policy  discourses  of  Commissioners 
for Enlargement have reiterated the importance of the EU’s specific 
conception of conditionality  for the diffusion of European norms 
and values in the framework of enlargement (EC 2005). Analogies 
have also been drawn with the ENP. As the Polish Commissioner 
for Regional policy, Danuta Hübner, recently highlighted in her dis-
course entitled, “The essential role of Community conditionality in 
the triumph of democracy and market economy”:  
 
“The European Union can only gain by integrating progressively 
with neighbouring European countries. The conditionality embed-
ded in the Action Plans with the countries of Eastern Europe and 
the  Caucasus  will  gradually  extend  the  space  of  democracy  and 
peace” (Hübner, 2006).  
 
But the European Union has also learnt from negative experiences 
with conditionality in Eastern non-candidate states. The speeches of 
B.  Ferrero-Waldner  highlight  the  EU’s  preference  for  positive 
rather than negative measures: “Diplomacy requires carrots as well 
as sticks, whether we are talking about weapons of mass destruction 
or  promoting  stability  and  prosperity  in  our  neighbourhood. (…) 
Access to the world’s biggest internal market and our sizeable assis-
tance  programmes  are  considerable  carrots”  (Ferrero-Waldner 
2006a). As pointed out by Lynch (2004), the design of the new ENP 
strategy, in particular, has stemmed from the shortcomings of the 
EU existing policies. Traditional (negative) conditionality imposed 
on Belarus’s authoritarian state has yielded little, and the EU has 
had little influence over the Transdniestria conflict in Moldova.
12 
Officials  of  the  Commission  have  thus  learnt  lessons  similar  to 
                                                 
12 Previous economic sanctions toward the USSR, South Africa and Iran also of-
fered negative experiences for the European Community (Wilde D’Estmael 1998). 212  European Political Economy Review  
   
those from the enlargement but in a different context: Success or 
failure of negative and positive conditionality is mainly linked to 
the national context and to the political will of third states to coop-
erate  and  to  introduce  national  reforms  (interviews,  EC,  DG 
Enlargement, 2004; DG Relex, 2006). Like Günter Verheugen ex-
plained in 2004:  
 
“One basic principle behind the ring of friends we are forging is 
joint ownership. Of course, we cannot impose the policy on any 
neighbour.  We  are  offering  closer  co-operation  across  the  broad 
spectrum of our relations, from political dialogue to economic inte-
gration” (Verheugen, 2004).  
 
The rather coercive approach of conditionality – as it is often de-
scribed in the literature (e.g. Dolowitz, Marsh, 1996) – was there-
fore completed by more voluntary measures like new policy ideas 
(commitments to common values), a philosophy based on differen-
tiation, mutual agreements or joint-ownership (partnership), partici-
pation and deconcentration/decentralisation as well as by innovative 
ways of controlling and evaluating the meeting of accession criteria 
or commitments. These have been tested in a more extensive way 
by the EU enlargement reforms and the EU development policy, be-
fore it was adopted by the ENP (Tulmets, 2003, 2006).  
 
4.3  A new method as a way to build an over-arching policy 
 
On the basis of various empirical elements collected between 2000 
and 2005 (cf. Tulmets 2005b), I argue that a new method that was 
introduced during enlargement (“Agenda 2000”), has  many  simi-
larities to the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) that was cre-
ated for employment and social politics. Since the method was cre-
ated to coordinate the member states’ policies in policy fields where 
there  is  no European acquis and  where  intergovernmental proce-
dures are a rule (Trubek 2002; Dehousse 2004), it is not surprising 
that it could be adapted to foreign policy issues (Tulmets 2005a,c). 
The innovative working documents and procedures have the same 
function; they hold different names and labels in order to differenti-
ate the context of their usage.  
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When  adapted  into  the  EU’s  external  relations  field,  the  new 
method presents the following characteristics: 
 
1) Policy objectives are adopted by the European Council, based on 
the Commission’s proposition.  
2)  The  rights  and  duties  of  the  third  states  are  inscribed  in  the 
agreements concluded between the EU and each third state (con-
tractualisation of relations, soft law). Thus, the third state has to de-
fine  its  responsibilities  in  more  detailed,  public  documents.  It  is 
constantly  (re)negotiating  with  the  Commission  and  the  member 
states the conditions for which these reforms must be implemented 
(negotiation  chapters  in  the  process  of  enlargement)  in  bilateral 
committees, created in the  framework of  its economic agreement 
with the EU. 
3) The Commission  manages the  monitoring process at its head-
quarters  in  Brussels,  through  its  delegations  abroad  and  bilateral 
committees. 
4) The Commission and the member states assist the implementa-
tion process through financial and technical assistance. The member 
states  facilitate  the  exchange  of  good  and  best  practices  through 
European programmes coordinated by the Commission and national 
assistance measures.  
5) The actors concerned by the policy can be consulted during a 
phase of negotiation and agreement with the EU, through the elabo-
ration of national documents or by implementation at the level of 
the member states and/or of the Commission. 
6) Experts from the member states and other regional organisations 
(OECD,  Council  of  Europe,  and  OSCE)  participate  in  the  peer-
review  process.  The  Commission  publishes  annual  evaluations, 
which are transmitted to the Council and the European Parliament. 
7) The policy objectives are readjusted at the European level on the 
basis of evaluations and the proposition of the Commission. They 
are accepted by the European Council and are the basis for further 
adaptation in the foreign policy process.  
 
Interestingly, this new method also has the potential to bridge the 
gaps between the three pillars of the European Union. This is be-
cause the policy objectives (constantly renegotiated) are adopted at 
the European Council, the main common institution of these three 214  European Political Economy Review  
   
pillars. It therefore allows for the definition of the European “um-
brella” or “over-arching” policies and thus, abolishes the logic of 
“pillarisation”, as the Constitutional treaty of 2005 has proposed to 
do. The  method  was  also  introduced to  make  sure that the third 
states would agree on the norms that should be exported abroad, es-
pecially in fields like administrative or judicial capacity where there 
is no acquis, and EU norms and values will be implemented and en-
forced. 
 
However, in practice, the new method already presents some short-
comings. Although it should involve the partner countries in the ne-
gotiations, of the Action Plans, and in the monitoring phase, partici-
pation  of  the ENP  countries  remains  low  and  is often  limited  to 
governmental actors. Common values and benchmarks are not al-
ways easy to negotiate because the Commission often defines the 
agenda before the bilateral meetings (interviews with Georgian and 
Ukrainian experts, April 2007). Furthermore, the benchmarks are 
sometimes not precise enough to design aid projects according to 
the neighbours’ needs or to allow for objective evaluations on the 
Commission’s side.  
 
 
5.  Can  the  notion  of  “soft  power”  bridge  EU’s  capability-
expectations gap? 
 
5.1  Consistency  and  expertise  are  a  necessary  source  of  legiti-
macy 
 
If implementation and evaluation fall short, will the discourse on 
“soft power” (exporting EU values in a legitimate way) represent a 
sufficient reason for the EU’s public opinion to support this policy? 
Will it be attractive enough for the neighbouring countries to com-
ply with EU values? Certainly not! – Especially if promises and ex-
pectations are too high. Thus the EU has to work further on finding 
the right balance between input and output legitimacy (as defined 
by Scharpf 1999). When looking at output legitimacy, the ENP is 
not  perceived  as  equally  attractive  for  all  neighbouring  countries 
and it is still uncertain whether or not it can respond to the very het-
erogeneous expectations of its neighbours (Interviews, DG Relex, 
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EU’s Constitutional treaty, the EU’s task to increase internal consis-
tency and thus external coherence will not be facilitated. At present 
the main priority of the ENP is to achieve a minimal internal consis-
tency and to enhance its expertise about neighbouring countries in 
order to keep and increase its legitimacy and external coherence.  
 
Since it was launched in 2002, the ENP has been subject to various 
criticisms: Authors characterised it as a “new liberal imperialism” 
and the EU as a “soft form of hegemony” (Cooper 2002; Straten-
schulte 2004; Primatarova 2005). The will of becoming a pole of at-
traction can also be considered as a form of discursive coercion, 
which seeks for the adoption of EU’s norms by third states (Bially-
Mattern 2005). There are two ways for the ENP to avoid further 
criticism. Enhanced consistency would represent the first way for 
the EU to gain  internal as well  as external  legitimacy. Enhanced 
dialogue and further differentiation would represent the second way 
to increase ENP acceptance abroad. 
 
Since  the  EU’s  foreign  policy  has  been  best  characterised  as  a 
multi-level one (Smith M. 2005), the question of consistency is cen-
tral  in  external  policies,  especially  if  the  EU  wants  to  become  a 
“pole of attraction” and a global actor. Consistency can be defined 
around three  issues:  (a)  horizontal  consistency  between  the three 
EU pillars and EU policies; (b)  institutional  consistency  between 
community and intergovernmental processes of policy decision; (c) 
vertical consistency between EU and member states’ policies, espe-
cially in the phase of implementation (Nuttall 2005 : 97). Neverthe-
less, the means of achieving consistency are still debated. We have 
already pointed to some of the shortcomings of the new method, in-
spired  by  the  open  method of  coordination.  However,  these  new 
forms  of  cooperation,  which  have  emerged  over  these  last  years 
within  the  EU  (benchmarking,  enhanced  cooperation),  are  more 
voluntary and  less  binding  because there  is a  lack of  legitimacy. 
Thus, there is still hope that they may help to leave the bottleneck of 
intergovernmentalism in the field of foreign policy. Therefore, the 
Commission should improve its method. This is particularly impor-
tant because it could build a way out of the re-nationalisation debate, 
which exists in the field of external relations regarding competen-
cies between the member states and the Commission, especially af-
ter the failure of the constitutional treaty. Although participation is a 216  European Political Economy Review  
   
key notion in the ENP, the means that allow for better participation 
within the EU’s agencies and the enhanced “people-to-people” con-
tacts have been accepted only recently by the Council, although the 
Commission had already proposed them in 2003.  
 
Further, lessons on the use of these new discourses and  methods 
could be drawn on the experience of enlargement or other foreign 
policies. Better expertise about the countries would allow for better 
differentiation,  for  example  in  the  Action  Plans.  As  expertise  is 
lacking in Brussels, regular consultation with local partners is cen-
tral. Thus, the role of the delegations of the Commission abroad 
needs  to  be  increased  (Interview,  DG  Relex,  2006).  While  some 
member  states  already  have  lasting  contacts  with  specific  third 
states,  many  officials  at  the  Commission  consider  the  idea  of  a 
European external service, as proposed in the constitutional treaty 
of 2005, to be an important solution for the consistency and lack of 
local  expertise  issues.  The  process  of  deconcentration  as  experi-
enced during enlargement has given a growing and more political 
role to the delegations of the Commission. Delegations, in fact par-
ticipated in the undertaking of crucial tasks such as monitoring re-
forms and evaluating the meeting of the benchmarks as “guardians” 
of accession conditions. A similar process is envisaged for the ENP 
(Interview, DG Relex, April 2006). The launching of the European 
external service would see the  creation of  “European embassies” 
abroad on the basis of the delegations of the Commission, which 
would also include diplomats and experts from the member states. It 
would thus add more elements of consistency, i.e. between pillars, 
between the Commission and the member states, and between the 
member states themselves. Thus, the ENP – the “EU’s newest for-
eign  policy  instrument”  (Ferrero-Waldner  2006b)  –  represents  a 
way for the EU to test its capacity to become a consistent and co-
herent international actor, at least in its own neighbourhood.  
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
This  article  has  highlighted  the  fact  that  the  discourse  on  “soft 
power” represents  a  specific  approach  recently  developed  by  the 
European Union in order to co-opt rather than to coerce third coun-
tries in its neighbourhood. It refers to a combination of policy dis-Tulmets: Can “Soft Power” Bridge EU’s Capability-Expectations Gap?  217 
courses on the attractive power of European values and norms, and 
of a philosophy based on partnership, differentiation and participa-
tion. Enlargement and other sub-regional experiences offered inno-
vative policy ideas and policy tools so that the EU was able to pro-
pose  a  “new  vision”  to  its  neighbours  (EC  2003a).  Contrary  to 
Nye’s conception of the US’s “hard power” referring to military and 
economic might, the EU’s “hard power” only relies on condition-
ality, i.e. on shaming and potential economic sanctions. As the ENP 
has just recently been implemented, the question is now regarding 
how seriously the discourse on European norms and values will be 
taken abroad and what methods the EU will use to control compli-
ance and reinforce conditionality on the ground. This will be com-
plicated because the EU intends to find its own foreign policy style 
by exporting its norms, culture and values, yet it is still unsure about 
how to define itself.  
 
It seems that the EU is now embarking on an ideal and Kantian way 
– at least at the level of discourse – which is proving to be more 
fruitful than previous EU or US policies. Nevertheless, if the EU 
wants to do so it must work on the definition of its own internal 
consistency and external coherence, and be ready to adapt its policy 
to the perceptions and reactions of its neighbouring countries. If not, 
the European Union and its member states could be accused of hid-
ing  a  new  “imperialist”,  “unilateralist”  or  “hegemonic”  agenda 
(Cooper 2002; Stratenschulte 2004; Primatarova 2005) underneath 
their notion of partnership. 
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Academic definitions of EU’s international role  
Wording 
 
Author(s)  Object/Context  Definitions  Criticism 
Soft power  Joseph  Nye 
(1990b) 
 
 
 
 
 
Object:  American  Foreign 
Policy (USA) 
Context: Post-Cold War 
 
 
 
 
„power means an ability to do things and control others, to get others to do what they otherwise would not” (p. 
154); “power diffused from government to private actors” (p. 162); “soft co-optive power is just as important as 
hard command power. If a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of the others, it will encounter 
less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow. If it can 
establish intentional norms consistent with its society, it is less likely to have to change. (…) it may be spared 
the costly exercise of coercive or hard power” (p. 167). 
Robert Kagan (2002) 
USA is not a soft power  (context: 
war in Afghanistan, in Irak) 
François  Du-
chêne  (1972, 
1973) 
Object:  Foreign Policy  of the 
European Community (EC) 
Context:  Cold  War,  EC 
enlargement  to  UK,  IRL  and 
DK 
A civilian power is “a civilian group long on economic power and relatively short on armed forces” (p. 19); 
“The European Community will only make the most of its opportunities if it remains true to its inner characteris-
tics. These are primarily: civilian ends and means, and a built-in sense of collective action, which in turn ex-
press, however imperfectly, social values of equality, justice and tolerance. (…) The European Community must 
be a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards or it will itself be more or less vic-
tim of power politics run by powers stronger and more cohesive than itself. In the long run, as Jean Monnet has 
said, there is no statesmanship without generosity”. (p. 20-21) 
Hedley Bull (1982) 
EC cannot be a power if it stays a 
civilian power, i.e. if it has no mili-
tary power 
Karen  Smith  (2000);  Treacher 
(2004) 
The  EU  is  not  a  civilian  power 
anymore,  since a CFSP and  ESDP 
was launched in the 1990s 
Civilian  
power 
Hanns  Maull 
(1990) 
Kirste/Maull 
(1996) 
Object:  German  and  Japan 
Foreign Policy after WWII  
Context: Cold War, post-Cold 
War 
Civilian power is a state “whose conception of its foreign policy role and behaviour is bound to particular aims, 
values, principles, as well as forms of influence and instruments of power in the name of a civilisation of inter-
national relations” (1996, p. 300) 
 
Five inter-related policy dimensions: 1) Constrain and monopolize use of force/promote peaceful settlement of 
conflict; 2) Promote rule of law and institutions; 3) Promote culture of non-violence; 4) Promote social fair-
ness/distributory justice; 5) Promote participatory decision. 
Zielonka (2002) 
The  1997-98  militarization  of  the 
Union  weakened  its  “distinct  pro-
file” as a civilian international iden-
tity 
Stelios Stavridis (2001) 
The use  of military  force  does  not 
mean the end of the civilian power 
(ex. of civil-military actions) 
Normative 
power 
Ian  Manners 
(2002) 
Object:  External  relations  of 
the European Union (EU) 
Context:  Introduction  of  con-
ditionality in EU external rela-
tions,  reforms  of EU  external 
policies (1997-2001) 
“Conceptions of EU as either a civilian power or a military power, both located in discussions of capabilities, 
need to be augmented with a focus on normative power of an ideational nature characterized by common princi-
ples and a willingness to disregard Westphalian conventions. This is not to say that the EU’s civilian power, or 
fledgling military power, are unimportant, simply that its ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in interna-
tional relations needs to be given much greater attention”. (p. 239). Therefore, normative power is neither mili-
tary nor purely economic, but one that works through ideas and opinions.  
Sjursen (2006a) 
(special issue) 
Thomas Diez (2005) 
Questions the  meaning  of “power” 
in  the  expression  “normative 
power”  